Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human Rights Norms? The Challenge of  Defamation of Religion by Blitt, Robert C.
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 1
Fall 2010
Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging
International Human Rights Norms? The
Challenge of "Defamation of Religion"
Robert C. Blitt
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Blitt, Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human Rights Norms? The Challenge of "Defamation of
Religion", 9 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 1 (2010).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol9/iss1/1
Copyright 2010 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 9, Number 1 (Fall 2010) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging 
International Human Rights Norms?  
The Challenge of “Defamation of Religion” 
Robert C. Blitt* 
I. INTRODUCTION: DRAFTING A BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
¶1 The decision to draft a bill of rights heralds a momentous event in any 
country’s history. In the latter half of the 20th century, crafting a document that addresses 
the fundamental rights of individuals and groups and their relationship to the state has 
typically involved a flurry of public consultations, negotiations, drafting, and rewrites. 
Increasingly, however, such endeavors remain incomplete without some effort to 
observe, understand, and account for comparative trends related to human rights on the 
international level as well as in other states. Although writing about constitutions 
specifically, A.E. Dick Howard’s observations are equally relevant to standalone bills of 
rights: 
The international human rights revolution has had undeniable impact upon 
comparative constitutionalism. It is hard to imagine drafters of a new 
constitution going about their task unconcerned about human rights 
standards … For half a century, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights has served as a model for constitution makers. Countless 
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constitutions written since 1948 contain guarantees that either mirror or 
draw upon the Declaration.1 
 
¶2 Numerous examples across a wide range of states confirm this tilt in favor of 
consulting international norms.2 Recent drafting efforts in Iraq,3 Afghanistan,4 New 
Zealand,5 South Africa,6 and all the states of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact7 
leap to mind, to name but a few. In each of these cases – and with varying degrees of 
success – national drafters held their country’s unique cultural, historical, and political 
experiences up against the collective database of international experiences to divine 
commonalities, mutual priorities, shared aspirations, and points of divergence. Although 
no bright line rule has emerged requiring states drafting new bills of rights to undertake 
such a comparative assessment or import wholesale the standards contained in the major 
international human rights instruments, the pattern of consultation and endorsement is 
undeniable and may even signal an emerging international customary norm.8 Indeed, in 
the past, the European Union has made diplomatic recognition of states conditional on 
their willingness to pledge respect for human rights and provide legal “guarantees for the 
rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities.”9 
¶3 Along this line of reasoning, a further issue arises as to whether established 
international standards represent the normative ceiling or only the floor. Should states 
                                                 
1 A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler From An Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative 
Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3, 18 (2009).  
2 The majority of these states integrated bills of rights into their new constitutional documents. New 
Zealand focused exclusively on drafting a standalone bill of rights, a process currently being contemplated 
by Australia.  
3 Though ultimately deleted from Iraq’s 2005 constitution, a draft version contained a provision that would 
have explicitly provided individuals “the rights contained in international human rights agreements to 
which Iraq is a party as long as those rights did not contradict the provisions of the constitution.” Ashley S. 
Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 32 (2007). 
The final constitutional text specifies that Iraq “shall observe the principles of good neighborliness…and 
respect its international obligations.”  IRAQ CONST., 2005, art. 8. 
4 Afghanistan’s constitution requires the state to “abide by the UN charter, international treaties, 
international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 
Afg. CONST., 2004, art. 7. 
5 New Zealand’s 1990 Bill of Rights stipulates that one of its purposes is “[t]o affirm New Zealand’s 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, 1990 Public Act No. 109 (N.Z.). 
6 It is widely acknowledged that South Africa’s constitution drafting process borrowed from international 
treaties, national constitutions and international and foreign jurisprudence. Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of 
Constitutional Borrowings On the Drafting of South Africa’s Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human 
Rights Provisions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 177 (1998).  
7 In central and eastern Europe generally, international law, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), was “universally 
perceived” as one of the most important sources of human rights used for modeling new constitutional 
regulations. Wiktor Osiatynski, Rights In New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 111, 161 (1994). 
8 This paper is limited to exploring the relevancy of one possible emerging international human rights norm 
on the bill of rights dialogue unfolding in Australia. The larger question of whether states may be obligated 
to incorporate international human rights standards under customary international law when drafting a bill 
of rights is set aside for another occasion. 
9 Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union,” Dec. 16, 1991, 31 ILM 1485, 1487 (1992). 
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engaged in a bill of rights drafting process aspire to adopt not only minimalist existing 
norms but also emerging ones that arguably embody the natural normative extension of 
human rights but have yet to become entrenched? As Jacek Kurczewski and Barry 
Sullivan point out, the notion of minimum standards in human rights law “dialectically 
entails as well the notion of something more demanding than the minimum – that is, the 
possible expansion of rights to which people are entitled.”10 From this perspective, many 
additional questions follow: How much further should a state go? What is the 
international status of cutting-edge issues such as intersex and transsexual rights, the right 
to an adequate standard of living,11 and migrant rights? What, if anything, should a newly 
drafted bill of rights say on these issues? 
¶4 At least in part, these questions can be addressed procedurally within the 
discussion over whether the bill of rights will be a succinctly worded statement that takes 
a general approach, or a longer document that engages specificities. Substantively, 
however, drafters also have a duty to inform themselves of what, if any, emerging human 
rights issues are relevant, and how they should be addressed. 
¶5 Using this understanding as a point of departure, the following article posits 
that beginning the arduous task of drafting a bill of rights from a standpoint of openness 
toward comparativism and engagement with international norms affords the process 
several advantages. First, it informs the public at large that the discussion over the nature 
and scope of rights does not occur in the vacuum of domestic politics alone, but rather 
implicates larger ideas relevant to humanity as a whole.12 Second, it allows a state the 
ability to consciously check any drafted domestic standards against its pre-existing 
international obligations under treaty or customary law. This in turn affords drafters an 
opportunity from the outset to furnish clear answers for basic questions such as whether 
international or regional human rights treaty obligations will be directly enforceable on 
the municipal level. Even where existing treaty rights are determined to be non-
justiciable, drafters can still test to what extent proposed domestic standards measure up 
against international norms.13 Finally, exploring comparative and international 
experiences situates the debate in a broader context that is necessarily more diverse, more 
informative, and more comprehensive. By plugging into this fecund ideascape, drafters 
can build up a robust domestic understanding of the content of rights and their related 
limitations, the dynamics of public-private and individual-group relationships, and the 
                                                 
10 Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democracies, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 259 (2002). 
11 The National Human Rights Consultation Report has recommended that “if economic and social rights 
are listed in a federal Human Rights Act, those rights not be justiciable and that complaints be heard by the 
Australian Human Rights Commission.” NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION, NATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT (Sept. 30, 2009), at xxxv, 
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Report_NationalHumanRightsCon
sultationReportDownloads#pdf (hereinafter NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT). 
12 By this, I simply mean that the experience of one state’s drafting process and final instrument may in the 
future help inform the drafting process of the next state contemplating a new or revised bill of rights. 
13 This advantage resonates with the Australian Human Rights Commission’s existing mandate, which 
includes “making human rights values part of everyday life and language” and “keeping government 
accountable to national and international human rights standards.” About the Commission, AUSTRALIAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
Australia’s federal parliament established the Commission (formerly the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission) in 1986 as an independent statutory body that reports to Parliament through the 
Attorney-General. 
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existing mechanisms for balancing competing interests where inevitable conflicts may 
arise. Related to this, exploring comparative and international sources affords the benefit 
of alerting drafters to emerging rights or norms that otherwise might not figure in the 
domestic debate, providing additional opportunity to tweak the proposed language. 
Ultimately, such efforts – although more time-consuming and complex – can challenge 
pre-existing ideas and limitations, resulting in a more vibrant drafting process and more 
thoroughly “beta-tested” final product.  
¶6 With these advantages in mind, the following article considers the emerging 
norm of “defamation of religion” – one recent flashpoint in the international human rights 
dialogue – in the context of Australia’s bill of rights drafting process. Incorporating an 
earnest assessment of comparative experiences and benchmarks into a bill of rights 
drafting process is a natural and worthy step for the government of Australia, particularly 
in light of the country’s long history of international engagement14 and its ongoing 
commitment to international human rights.15 This approach also respects the stated desire 
of many Australians to ensure their government “protect[s] and promote[s] all the human 
rights reflected in its obligations under international human rights law.”16 Indeed, the 
Australian government has identified the advancement of human rights as every nation’s 
responsibility: “[T]he function of government is to safeguard the dignity and rights of 
individuals, whose lives should be free of violence, discrimination, vilification, and 
hatred. … [W]e do not rest on our laurels. We continue to strive to protect and promote 
human rights and to address disadvantage.”17 
                                                 
14 For example, H. V. Evatt, an Australian, served as President of the UN General Assembly during the 
adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Australia was an original 
signatory to that Declaration. Doc Evatt: A brilliant & Controversial Character, THE EVATT FOUNDATION, 
http://evatt.labor.net.au/about_evatt/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).  
15 In the words of the Australian government: “Australia’s commitment to the aims and purposes of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects our national values and is an underlying principle of 
Australia’s engagement with the international community.” Australia: Seeking Human Rights for All, 
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.au/hr/hr_for_all.html (last visited Oct. 
11, 2010). Australia is a state party to all but two of the nine main human rights treaties. It regularly reports 
to each of the bodies responsible for overseeing the implementation of these treaties. OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR) - REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE 
PACIFIC, RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: ADDED VALUE FOR THE PACIFIC REGION 
15 (2009), available at http://pacific.ohchr.org/docs/RatificationBook.pdf. Australia has not signed or 
ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, which entered into force on July 1, 2003. As of November 2010, this treaty had mustered 
only 44 state parties. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no western or central European state 
has ratified the treaty; Serbia is the only other European signatory to the convention. International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
adopted Dec. 18, 1990, 45 U.N.T.S. 158, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en. 
Australia also has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. This treaty has not yet entered into force because it lacks the minimum number of state 
parties; twenty ratifications are required, only 19 have been secured to date (status as at: November 11, 
2010). International Convention for the Protection of All persons from Enforced Disappearance, opened for 
signature Dec. 20, 2006 61 U.N.T.S. 488, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-16&chapter=4&lang=en.  
16 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 73. 
17 Human Rights, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Humanrightsandanti-discrimination_Humanrights (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2010) (emphasis added).  
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¶7 Given this firm commitment to an expansive understanding of rights, 
Australia can and should aspire to adopt not only minimalist existing norms but the 
emerging ones that embody the natural normative extension of human rights. Indeed, as 
the Law Council of Australia suggested during the recently completed National Human 
Rights Consultation process, “Australia should actively engage with the process of 
developing new human rights principles through its interaction with international human 
rights bodies.”18 Obviously, this responsibility doesn’t begin and end with the 
international bodies. Rather, it logically entails that Australia adopt the same position vis 
à vis the process of developing new human rights principles on the home front as well. 
¶8 This said, the notion of defamation of religion poses a challenge to the 
presumed desire to incorporate and strengthen domestic and international human rights 
regimes. As will be argued below, this putative norm has the effect of attenuating rather 
than reinforcing the traditional scope of freedom of expression and freedom of religion or 
belief. Yet it has consistently garnered strong support on the international level and 
therefore may be trending in the direction of an emerging customary norm. Faced with 
this possibility, the question arises as to whether Australia’s bill of rights process should 
account for defamation of religion, and if so, how. 
¶9 In the next section, I offer a brief comparative history of the offense of 
blasphemy to help contextualize the intended meaning of defamation of religion. The 
third part of this article discusses how defamation of religion became the focus of dozens 
of United Nations (UN) resolutions, assesses the challenges associated with grafting the 
legal concept of defamation onto the mercurial notion of religion and its potential 
implications for existing international law, and finally takes stock of the ongoing debate 
as it stands today. The fourth part of this article draws some preliminary conclusions 
concerning the possible impact of enforcing a norm against defamation of religion, and 
addresses to what extent—if at all—Australia should incorporate a response to this 
emerging norm in any future bill of rights. 
II. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY: A FOUNDATION FOR 
UNDERSTANDING DEFAMATION OF RELIGION 
A. Blasphemy in the West 
¶10 In theological terms, blasphemy is equated with “a direct criticism of God 
and sacred objects.”19 The legal definition of blasphemy “developed historically to meet 
various, primarily political rather than religious, perceptions of a need for the law to 
protect institutions, originally the State itself.”20 In other words, the challenge posed by 
alleged heretics and blasphemers represented nothing less than an act of state treason 
threatening the very foundation of a society held together with the brick and mortar of an 
exclusive religious conviction.21 The state could level blasphemy-related charges against 
                                                 
18 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 72. 
19 Reid Mortensen, Blasphemy In A Secular State: A Pardonable Sin?, 17 U.N.S.W.L.J. 409, at 409 (1994).  
20 SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORT-APPENDIX 3: 
BLASPHEMY Para. 7 (2003), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/9515.htm.  
21 For example, in recognizing blasphemy as a common law offense in 17th century England, the court held 
that “to say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved, 
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an individual to protect the social or ideological underpinnings of society, or more 
specifically, use such charges to “suppress the expression of religious beliefs or opinions” 
that the dominant group believed to be false.22 As U.S. Justice Felix Frankfurter famously 
observed, “Blasphemy was the chameleon phrase which meant the criticism of whatever 
the ruling authority of the moment established as orthodox religious doctrine.”23 
¶11 In many states today, the offenses of blasphemy and heresy are viewed as 
antiquated tools for protecting a given ruler’s religious worldview at the expense of all 
other differing opinions. Indeed, as religion and state gradually decoupled in the west,24 
charges of blasphemy grew more infrequent. While prosecutions for blasphemy in the 
United States became “no more frequent than the sightings of snarks,”25 the common law 
offense persisted in England until its abolition in 2008.26 Prior to this, UK courts 
concluded that blasphemy required little in the way of intent,27 could result in a sentence 
of hard labor,28 and only operated to protect the Church of England and its specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
and that Christianity is parcel of the laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to 
speak in subversion of the law.” R v. Taylor, 1 Vent. 293 (1676); 86 Eng. Rep 189 (K.B.). In this brief 
quote, the court made plain the linkage between safeguarding the dominant faith and preserving the social 
and political order of the day. 
22 Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 
1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 251, 289 (1999). Consequently, any nonconformist criticism of the dominant 
church—whether real or perceived—was not only dangerous, but considered “necessarily wrong when 
emanating from inferior subjects against their masters.” LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 
5 (1985). 
23 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 529 (1952). 
24 This trend may be linked to broader conditions of modernity leading to the secularization of society, 
wherein religion “becomes increasingly a private concern of the individual and thus loses much of its 
public relevance and influence.” Riaz Hassan, Expressions of religiosity and blasphemy in modern 
societies, NEGOTIATING THE SACRED: BLASPHEMY AND SACRILEGE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 119 
(Elizabeth Burns Coleman & Kevin White eds.) (2006). 
25 LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD x (1981) (referring to LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF 
THE SNARK: AN AGONY IN EIGHT FITS (1876)). 
26 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Section 79 (2008) (Eng.), 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080004_en_1. The 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
arguably prohibits some acts that may have previously constituted blasphemy, however its provisions apply 
equally to all religions. Part 3A of the 2006 Act addresses “[h]atred against persons on religious grounds.” 
Under Section 29B(1), “[a] person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written 
material which is threatening, is guilty of an offense if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred.” The 
term “religious hatred” is defined as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious 
belief or lack of religious belief.” In addition to the offense requiring the impugned communication to 
constitute a threat, Section 29J provides detailed protection for freedom of expression: 
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts 
discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular 
religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the 
beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion 
or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system. 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060001_en_1. The 
issue of incitement is discussed at greater length below. 
27 In 1979, the House of Lords affirmed a minimal threshold of intent for the offense of blasphemy, 
endorsing the trial judge’s direction that “guilt of the offence of publishing a blasphemous libel did not 
depend on the accused having an intent to blaspheme, but that it was sufficient for the prosecution to prove 
that the publication had been intentional and that the matter published was blasphemous.” R. v. Lemon 
(Denis), [1979] A.C. 617, 618 (also known as Whitehouse v. Lemon). 
28 William Gott, the last individual in the UK sentenced to a prison term for blasphemy, served nine months 
hard labor for distributing pamphlets describing Jesus Christ entering Jerusalem “like a circus clown on the 
back of two donkeys.” [1922] 16 CR. APP. R. 87, 89. 
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doctrines rather than all religious beliefs.29 In other states where blasphemy was not 
abolished outright, alleged violations were left unprosecuted or became unenforceable 
“either through stricter intent requirements or judicial attempts to strike a balance 
between conflicting rights.”30 
¶12 In Australia, the last successful prosecution for blasphemy occurred in 
1871.31 The 1990s ushered in an era of renewed interest related to the common law 
offense of blasphemy, in part triggered by the Salman Rushdie affair in the United 
Kingdom.32 In 1991, the New South Wales (NSW) parliament requested that the Law 
Reform Commission explore “whether the present law relating to the offence of 
blasphemy is adequate and appropriate to current conditions.”33 In undertaking its 
mandate, the Commission acknowledged two key questions: first, “whether the offence 
[of blasphemy] is anachronistic in a modern society … which is multicultural, pluralistic, 
and secular, and maintains a strict separation between Church and State”; and second, 
“whether the offence of blasphemy improperly impinges upon the fundamental right of 
freedom of speech.”34 Because the offense of blasphemy had not been successfully 
prosecuted in over a century, the Commission also observed that there was “a real 
question whether blasphemy still exists in the criminal law of New South Wales, even if 
it was ‘received’ as law in colonial times.”35  
¶13 As part of its findings, the Commission identified “several pieces of 
legislation in New South Wales … [that] assume[d] the existence of the crime” despite 
uncertainties regarding its reception from England.36 Surveying the status of blasphemy 
in Australia’s other states and territories, the Commission also found that apart from 
section 574 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), only the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
contained another express statutory reference to blasphemy.37 In contrast, other 
Australian jurisdictions had either abolished the offense altogether or maintained it only 
as a common law crime. 
¶14 After weighing various options regarding the common law offense of 
blasphemy, including retention, progressive codification, selective replacement, and 
outright abolition, the Commission endorsed abolition without a substitute offense as the 
best option for NSW.38 The Commission’s recommendation stemmed from the status of 
                                                 
29 In Choudhury v. UK (1991) 12 HRLJ 172, members of Britain’s Muslim community sought 
unsuccessfully to prosecute author Salman Rushdie for allegedly blaspheming against Islam in his novel, 
THE SATANIC VERSES; see also Q & A: Blasphemy law, BBC NEWS, Oct. 18, 2004, 
http://news.bbe.c.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3753408.stm.  
30 Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 303, 354 
(2008). For example, Germany’s criminal code forbids insulting religion publicly or by dissemination of 
publications. However, successful prosecution requires “the manner and content” of the insult to rise to 
such a level that an objective onlooker could reasonably conclude it would disturb the peace of those 
targeted. Id. at 355-56. 
31 R v. Jones (Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court Quarter Sessions, Simpson J, 1871) (Austl.), 
in Butterworths, 23 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF AUSTRALIA 365, 695 (1996). 
32 Siddique & Hayat, supra note 29.  
33 NSW Blasphemy Report, 74 Terms of Reference, available at  
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R74TOR [hereinafter NSW Blasphemy Report]. 
34 Id. ch. 1, ¶¶ 1.2-1.3. 
35 Id. ¶ 1.4.  
36 Id. ch. 2, ¶ 2.14.   
37 Id. ch. 3, ¶ 3.2. 
38 Id. ch. 4, ¶¶ 4.3, 4.81.  
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the offense in NSW, its finding that there had been “no prosecutions for blasphemy in 
other Australian states, Scotland, Ireland, New Zealand or other comparable jurisdictions 
for over 50 years, and … the fact that every law reform commission which [had] 
considered blasphemy law reform … recommended abolition of the offence.”39  As a 
potential alternative, the Commission also found that anti-discrimination statutes were: 
better designed to preserve public order and social cohesion in a modern 
democratic society, given several important considerations: the emphasis 
on education and conciliation in the first instance; the clarity of the 
elements of the offences, and the protection of debate or discussion carried 
out in good faith; the more realistic penalties; and the requirement of the 
consent of the Attorney General before criminal proceedings may be 
instituted.40 
¶15 On the federal level, Australia’s early legislation revealed several efforts to 
enforce anti-blasphemy measures, particularly in literature, television, and film.41 
However, in 1992, a federal Law Reform Commission recommended that: “All 
references to blasphemy in federal legislation … be removed. Offences that protect 
personal and religious sensibilities should be recast in terms of ‘offensive material.’”42 
This recommendation stemmed from the Commission’s opposition to extending the law 
of blasphemy for the purpose of covering religions other than Christianity. In the 
Commission’s view it “would be very difficult to devise a satisfactory definition of 
religion [to encompass faiths other than Christianity] and would be an unreasonable 
interference with freedom of expression” to perpetuate the offense of blasphemy.43 In the 
wake of these findings, Australia’s federal government acted to repeal much of the 
legislation containing blasphemy-related offenses.44 
¶16 More recently, in the “Piss Christ” case,45 Melbourne’s Catholic Archdiocese 
sought an injunction against the display of an allegedly blasphemous photograph by artist 
Andres Serrano. The photo, to be exhibited at the National Gallery of Victoria, depicted a 
crucified Jesus Christ which the artist had immersed in urine. The Supreme Court of 
Victoria, noting that there was “no evidence … of any unrest of any kind following or 
likely to follow the showing of the photograph in question,” held against the plaintiff, and 
also stated the need to contextualize the dispute with “regard to contemporary standards 
                                                 
39 Id. ¶ 4.80. 
40 Id. ¶ 4.31. 
41 Id. ch. 3, ¶ 3.12.  
42Australian Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, ALRC Report 57, Chapter 7, ¶ 7.59 
(1992).  
43 Id. ¶ 7.59. 
44 The Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act of 1995 repealed the previous 
Customs (Cinematograph Films) Regulations of the Commonwealth. The prohibition against blasphemous 
works or articles contained in the 1956 Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations was discarded by an 
amendment. Likewise, section 118 of the Broadcasting Act 1942, prohibiting the broadcast of blasphemous 
material, was similarly excised by virtue of being replaced with the Broadcasting Services (Transitional 
Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 1992. 
45 Pell v. Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria (1998) 2 V.R. 391, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/1997/52.html. For a discussion of this case, see Bede Harris, 
Pell v. Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria: Should Blasphemy Be A Crime? The ‘Piss 
Christ’ Case and Freedom of Expression, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 217.  
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in a multicultural, partly secular and largely tolerant, if not permissive, society.”46 The 
Court concluded that if it were to “grant the relief sought by the plaintiff, [it] might 
thereby use the force of the law to prevent that which, by the same law, is lawful.”47 
B. Blasphemy in Muslim States 
¶17 As noted above, blasphemy at its origin represented an ecclesiastical offense. 
In the Christian west, government implementation and enforcement of blasphemy laws 
through the common law often protected only specific iterations of the Christian faith.  
All other comers – including Muslims, Jews, and Hindus – had no means of bringing the 
wrath of the law to bear against the perceived disparagement of their respective religions. 
¶18 Governments in the Muslim world similarly sought to outlaw offenses 
equivalent to blasphemous conduct. Authorities invoked religious or statutory law to 
impose a variety of penalties against blasphemy, apostasy, and other related acts.48 Like 
their western counterparts, these offenses49 also shared a clearly identifiable connection 
with notions of treason or sedition against the state. This resulted in part due to the 
absence of any bright line separation between religion and state under the banner of 
Islam.50 As Cherif Bassiouni has remarked, Islam provides a “holistic conception of life, 
government, law and hereafter. There is no division of church and state; there is no 
division between matters temporal and religious, and between different aspects of law.”51  
¶19 While the current trend in the West indicates a tendency to discard 
blasphemy offenses into the trash bin of history,52 there appears to be no parallel 
movement within Muslim states. For example, in Pakistan, a declared Islamic state,53 
existing blasphemy laws continue to result in miscarriages of justice and “exacerbate a 
growing environment of dogma and intolerance – spawning a culture of extremism and 
violence.”54 The United States Department of State has observed that Pakistani 
                                                 
46 Pell, (1998) 2 V.R. 391. 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human Rights Law, and 
the Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375, and Perry S. Smith, Speak No Evil: 
Apostasy, Blasphemy and Heresy in Malaysian Syariah Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 357. 
49 Although no exact offense parallel to the Judeo-Christian offense of blasphemy exists under Islam, 
insulting God, Mohammed or any other aspect of divine revelation amounts to an offense under Sharia. See 
Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 WIILJ 349, 351-352. The 
article provides a long list of examples of blasphemy-type offenses prosecuted in the Muslim world. See 
also Hassan, supra note 24. 
50 See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS, 167-68 (4th ed. 
2007), and Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under Classical and Contemporary 
Islamic Law in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 387 (Johan 
D. van der Vyver and John Witte, eds., 1996). 
51 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, Speech, Religious Discrimination, and 
Blasphemy, Remarks at the American Society of International Law Proceedings (Apr. 7, 1989) in 83 
ASILPROC 427, 433. 
52 An exception to this trend is evident in Ireland’s recently passed Defamation Bill, which includes 
provisions covering the offense of blasphemy. See infra Part IV.   
53 For a closer examination of how the constitutional systems of Muslim states address religion-state 
relations, see Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim 
Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947 (2005). 
54 Siddique & Hayat, supra note 30, at 384. For example, consider the 14-year imprisonment of a mentally 
ill woman suspected of blasphemy and the Pakistani government’s failure to protect the Ahmadi 
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authorities “routinely use[] the blasphemy laws to harass religious minorities and 
vulnerable Muslims and to settle personal scores or business rivalries.”55 Most recently, 
gunmen in Pakistan’s Punjab province shot and killed two Christian brothers as they 
returned to prison after a court appearance on blasphemy charges,56 and several other 
Christians faced jail sentences57 for violating Pakistan’s Penal Code ordinances against 
blasphemy. Under the Code, any individual who “directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred 
name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad” is subject to “death, or imprisonment for life.”58 
¶20 In Malaysia, the federal constitution declares Islam as the official religion, 
but authorizes states rather than the federal government to legislate in the area of Islamic 
law.59 Within the Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan), Part III of 
the Syariah [Sharia] Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 enumerates 
“Offences Relating to the Sanctity of the Religion of Islam and its Institution,” which 
include “[i]nsulting, or bringing into contempt … the religion of Islam.”60 
¶21 This Act also proscribes “acts in contempt of religious authority” and 
“def[ying], disobey[ing] or disput[ing] the orders or directions [of the Majlis Agama 
Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Federal Territory Islamic Council)] expressed or given by 
                                                                                                                                                 
community, as well as its lackadaisical response in the face of violence targeting that community. See 
Mubasher Bukhari, Pakistan Court Frees Mentally Ill Blasphemy Suspect After 14 Years, REUTERS FAITH 
WORLD (Jul. 22, 2010) http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2010/07/23/pakistan-court-frees-mentally-ill-
blasphemy-suspect-after-14-years/; Attackers Target Lahore’s Ahmadi Worshippers; 70 Dead, DAWN, May 
29, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/news/pakistan/metropolitan/04-lahore-blasts-qs-07. 
55 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2009 (Oct. 26, 2009). During the 
previous reporting period, Pakistani “authorities arrested at least 25 Ahmadis, 11 Christians, and 17 
Muslims on blasphemy charges.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 
2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108505.htm.; see also infra text accompanying note 77.  
56 Fareed Khan, On Trial for Blasphemy, Two Christian Brothers Murdered in Faisalabad, ASIA NEWS 
(Jul. 19, 2010, 5:58 PM), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/On-trial-for-blasphemy,-two-Christian-brothers-
murdered-in-Faisalabad-18977.html; see infra text accompanying note 77.  
57 See, e.g., Fareed Khan, Karachi, A Christian Sentenced to Life Imprisonment for Blasphemy, ASIA NEWS  
(Feb. 27, 2010, 11:38 AM), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Karachi,-a-Christian-sentenced-to-life-
imprisonment-for-blasphemy-17749.html; Brian Sharma, Pakistan’s ‘Blasphemy’ Laws Claim 3 More 
Christians, THE CHRISTIAN POST  (Mar. 11, 2010, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.christianpost.com/article/20100311/pakistan-s-blasphemy-laws-claim-three-more-
christians/index.html.  
58 See Art. 295-C, PAK. PENAL CODE (Act XLV of 1860). The code also establishes punishments for other 
blasphemy-related offenses including “[d]eliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious 
feelings” and against anyone who “defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an.” See Arts. 
295-A and 295-B, PAK. PENAL CODE (Act XLV of 1860). 
59 Under Art. 3(1) of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution, “Islam is the religion of the Federation.” However, 
List II of the Constitution assigns significant legislative powers to the states pertaining to Islam (with 
certain limitations), including the creation and punishment of offences against precepts of Islam, as well as 
the constitution, organization and procedure of Sharia courts. Malay. CONST., 1994, arts. 3(1), 367  
(incorporating all amendments up to August 1994). 
60 Article 7 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 provides:  
7. Any person who orally or in writing or by visible representation or in any other manner—  
(a) insults or brings into contempt the religion of Islam;  
(b) derides, apes or ridicules the practices or ceremonies relating to the religion of Islam; or 
(c) degrades or brings into contempt any law relating to the religion of Islam for the time being in force 
in the Federal Territories . . . 
SYARIAH CRIMINAL OFFENCES (FEDERAL TERRITORIES) ACT 1997 §7, ACT 559, LAWS OF MALAYSIA 
(2006). For an overview of the situation related to blasphemy in Malaysia, see Smith, supra note 48.  
Vol. 9:1] ROBERT C. BLITT 
   
11
way of fatwa . . .”61 Upon conviction of either insulting Islam or defying an Islamic 
Council fatwa (a decision based on Islamic law), an individual is liable for a fine, prison 
sentence of up to two years, or both.62 According to the Administration of Islamic Law 
(Federal Territories) Act 1993, once a fatwa is issued by the Islamic Council and 
published in the official Gazette, it gains the status of enforceable law in the Federal 
Territories.63 In turn, such fatwas are binding on every Muslim resident in the Federal 
Territories, each of whom is obligated by a “religious duty to abide by and uphold the 
fatwa . . .”64 The Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 further 
mandates that all courts in the Federal Territories recognize gazetted fatwas “as 
authoritative of all matters laid down therein.”65 Even in the event that a fatwa is not 
published, at least one former high-level government advisor has contended that the 
ruling demands respect as a religious decree.66 
¶22 The influence of Malaysia’s various fatwa councils is far-reaching. On the 
federal level, the National Fatwa Council, a body intended to harmonize state-issued 
fatwas, has sought to prohibit Muslims from practicing yoga on the grounds that it risked 
“destroy[ing] a Muslim’s faith,”67 ban the “unacceptable” practice of women “dressing in 
the clothes men wear,”68 and prohibit exhibitions concerning ghosts.69 In a similar vein, 
the Islamic Religious Council in the central state of Selangor threatened to sue the 
Malaysian Bar Association for using the word “Allah” on its website.70 
¶23 In Indonesia, where the constitution is silent with regard to favoring 
secularism or Islam, the government actively invokes criminal ordinances to prosecute 
alleged blasphemy-related offenses. Under the Criminal Code, publicly “giving 
expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against one or more groups of the 
                                                 
61 Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 §9, Act 559, Laws of Malaysia (2006).  
62 Id. §§ 7, 9. 
63 ADMINISTRATION OF ISLAMIC LAW (FEDERAL TERRITORIES) ACT 1993 § 34(3), Act 505, LAWS OF 
MALAYSIA (2006). 
64 Id. According to Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman, a prime ministerial adviser on religious affairs, “The 
National Fatwa Council has been entrusted to deliberate on [questions of Islamic law] in depth and come 
out with edicts on them. And in an evolved world like ours … such a council plays an important role in 
providing ‘guidelines’ for these grey areas to Muslims.” Hariati Azizan, In a Twist Over Fatwa Ruling, THE 
STAR ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/11/30/focus/2683235. 
65 ACT 1993, supra note 63.  
66 Azizan, supra note 64. 
67 Niluksi Koswanage, Muslims Warned to Avoid Blasphemous Yoga, WELT ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2008), 
http://www.welt.de/english-news/article2766685/Muslims-warned-to-avoid-blasphemous-yoga.html; see 
also Robin Brant, Malaysia Clerics Issue Yoga Fatwa, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7743312.stm. Ultimately, Malaysia’s Prime Minister intervened to 
assure Muslims that yoga was still permissible, despite the fatwa’s stated prohibition. Malaysia Backs 
Down From Yoga Ban Amid Backlash, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AP2CA20081126. 
68 Malaysian Religious Council Issues Ban on Lesbian Sex, AFP, Oct. 23, 2008, available at 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5izKo_RKkF40cfljjibbi3Yai-5Tw.  
69 According to the National Fatwa Council chair, the decision was taken to avoid undermining the faith of 
Muslims by exposing them “to supernatural and superstitious beliefs.” Malaysia Issues Fatwa on Ghosts, 
AL JAZEERA (Apr. 13, 2007), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-
pacific/2007/04/200852513106697452.html. 
70 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Malaysia: Legal Body Faces Lawsuit for Using Word ‘Allah,’ 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM NEWS BLOG, (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://becketinternational.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/malaysia-legal-body-faces-lawsuit-for-using-word-
%E2%80%98allah%E2%80%99/. 
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population of Indonesia,” is punishable by a maximum imprisonment of four years or a 
fine.71 While the Indonesian law is admirable for its attempt to move away from 
protecting the majority faith exclusively, the U.S. Department of State has concluded that 
enforcement actions in practice “have almost always involved blasphemy and heresy 
against Islam.”72 Human Rights Watch likewise has concluded, “Indonesian laws 
prohibiting blasphemy are primarily applied to practices perceived to deviate from 
mainstream Islam.”73 Blasphemy charges have been invoked in a variety of situations, 
including an art exhibit containing photographic representations of fig leaf-covered Adam 
and Eve,74 and against various individuals claiming to be reincarnations of the Prophet 
Muhammad75 and the archangel Gabriel,76 among others. On a much broader scale, the 
government has severely restricted and even banned certain activities of the Ahmadi 
community,77 including public religious worship, as part of a clamp-down pattern 
targeting groups deemed “heretical,” “deviant,” or heterodox.78 Following Malaysia’s 
lead, Indonesia’s Ulema Council issued a similar fatwa prohibiting Muslims from 
practicing yoga for fear it might corrupt their faith.79 
¶24 From this brief overview – and in contrast to the present situation in most 
Western countries – snark sightings remain quite a common occurrence in the Muslim 
world. Many Muslim states continue to shield Islam from even minor criticism, and in 
certain instances use anti-blasphemy measures as an offensive tool to stifle the free 
exercise of religious belief for minority faiths and Muslim dissidents alike. As illustrated, 
such practices are not exclusive to religious regimes but rather may be observed across 
the spectrum of Muslim constitutional models – including in states that make no 
declaration regarding Islam as the official religion.80 It is from this milieu that the 
                                                 
71 PENAL CODE OF INDONESIA arts. 156-56(a), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffbcee24.html. For 
the purpose of these provisions, the term “group” is defined as a sector of the population that is 
distinguished by “race, country of origin, religion, origin, descent, nationality or constitutional condition.” 
Id. 
72 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2008 (2008).  The State Department 
report notes dozens of individuals charged and convicted under Indonesia’s criminal code. Id. 
73 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009 261 (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.  
74 Indonesia: Blasphemy case against Adam and Eve photo exhibit, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 3, 
2006, available at http://religion.info/english/articles/article_227.shtml.  
75 Peter Gelling, Indonesia Bans Sects It Deems Blasphemous, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/world/asia/16indo.html.  
76 Andra Wisnu, Lia Eden sentenced to prison, again, THE JAKARTA POST, June 3, 2009, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/03/lia-eden-sentenced-prison-again.html.  
77 The primary differentiation between Ahmadis and Muslims relates to the Ahmadi belief in the 
prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (founder of the Ahmadiyya faith). Recognition of this designation 
by Ahmadis contravenes the basic teaching under Islam that Mohammed was the final prophet. However, 
Ahmadis consider themselves devout Muslims faithful to the teachings of Islam. See M. Nadeem Ahmad 
Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community 
in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 275, 279-82 (1995-96); see also Amjad Mahmood Khan, Persecution of the 
Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations, 16 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 217 (2002-03). 
78 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 171 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/final%20ar2009%20with%20cover.pdf. 
79 Niniek Karmini, Indonesian Muslims Banned From Practicing Yoga, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.kilil5.com/news/19970_indonesian-muslims-banned-from-p.  
80 Because of space constraints, examples on anti-blasphemy measures in Turkey, a declared secular 
Muslim state, have been omitted. See Robert C. Blitt, The Bottom Up Journey of 'Defamation of Religion' 
from Muslim States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas 
Vol. 9:1] ROBERT C. BLITT 
   
13
movement to prohibit “defamation of religion” (originally expressed in the more specific 
and decidedly less ecumenical slogan “defamation of Islam”) emerged a decade ago to 
begin its journey in search of international legitimacy. 
III. DEFAMATION OF RELIGION: BLASPHEMY GOES INTERNATIONAL 
A. Origins of Defamation of Religion at the United Nations 
¶25 The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), whose fifty-seven 
member states represent “the collective voice of the Muslim world,”81 is responsible for 
spearheading the effort to secure international condemnation of acts deemed defamatory 
of religion – and more precisely, defamatory of Islam. In addition to its own reporting 
and resolutions on the issue,82 the OIC – working through its individual member states – 
has focused for the past ten years on adding the creation of a norm prohibiting 
defamation of religion to the agendas of various UN bodies. The first step in this effort 
came in 1999 when Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC, submitted a draft resolution 
entitled “Defamation of Islam” to the now defunct Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR).83 This proposed resolution sought to combat perceived negative international 
media coverage of “Islam as a religion hostile to human rights.”84 In the view of 
Pakistan’s UN ambassador, this negative media coverage amounted to a “defamation 
compaign [sic]” against the religion and its adherents to which the UNCHR had to 
react.85 The draft of the resolution sought to have the UNCHR both express “concern at 
the … spread [of] intolerance against Islam,”86 and call upon the Special Rapporteur on 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 132, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1729783. Despite the apparent unity in governmental 
approach across all four Muslim constitutional systems, recent sociological data on blasphemy hints at the 
possibility that differentiation may exist among the citizenry of these states, with public opinion more 
closely mirroring the expectation that declared secular states would demonstrate little interest in upholding 
blasphemy-related offenses while their more religious counterparts tend towards favoring such laws. See 
Hassan, supra note 24. 
81 About OIC, ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, http://www.oic-
oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52 (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
82 For a more detailed account of these activities, see Blitt, supra note 80. 
83 The first reference to defamation of Islam at the UN may be traced back to 1997. In reaction to a report 
addressing “Islamist and Arab Anti-Semitism” prepared by the UN Special Rapporteur on racism, 
Indonesia’s ambassador alleged “‘defamation of our religion Islam and blasphemy against its Holy Book 
Qur’an.’” Rene Wadlow and David Littman, Blasphemy at the United Nations?, IV MIDDLE EAST 
QUARTERLY 4, 85-86 (1997), available at http://www.meforum.org/379/blasphemy-at-the-united-nations. 
The UNCHR responded by adopting a consensus decision—supported by the United States and several 
other Western countries, which expressed “indignation and protest at the content of such an offensive 
reference to Islam and the Holy Qur’an . . . [a]ffirmed that that offensive reference should have been 
excluded from the report . . . [and] [r]equested . . . the Special Rapporteur to take corrective action in 
response.” Commission on Human Rights Res. 1997/125, Reps. of Commission on Human Rights, 53d 
Sess., U.N. Doc E/CN.4/DEC/1997/125 (Apr. 18, 1997). 
84 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 61st Meeting, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 
(Oct. 19, 1999) (quoting Ambassador Zamir Akram of Pakistan).  
85 Id. ¶¶ 1-2. 
86 Commission on Human Rights, Draft Resolution 1999/ . . . Defamation of Islam, at 2, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999). The Draft Resolution was submitted by Pakistan on behalf of members 
of the OIC. 
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religious intolerance to “continue to devote attention to attacks against Islam and attempts 
to defame it.”87 
¶26 In response to Pakistan’s draft, Western governments proposed amendments 
to de-specify Islam and approach the challenge of discrimination from a more general 
perspective inclusive of all religions.88 Subsequent Pakistani sub-amendments sought to 
preserve specificity relating to “defamatory attacks against [Islam]”89 and stressed that 
removing the resolution’s focus on Islam “would defeat the purpose of the text, which 
was to bring a problem relating specifically to that religion to the attention of the 
international community.”90 Following additional negotiations, a compromise resolution 
emerged expressing concern over the stereotyping of all religions rather than Islam alone, 
and which retained the term “defamation” in the resolution title only.91 The representative 
from Pakistan hailed the OIC member states’ “considerable flexibility” in agreeing to a 
compromise resolution.92 At the same time, Germany’s representative, speaking on behalf 
of the European Union (EU), stressed the EU’s collective “wish to make it clear that they 
did not attach any legal meaning to the term ‘defamation’ as used in the title.”93  
¶27 This seemingly insignificant resolution served as defamation’s proverbial 
foot in the door at the UN for two reasons: first, it tasked two UN special rapporteurs 
with taking into account provisions of the resolution in future reports to the UNCHR; and 
second, it expressed the UNCHR’s intent “to remain seized of the matter.”94 
Consequently, the effort to install a prohibition on defamation of religion became 
systematized and integrated not only into the UNCHR agenda, but also into the mandates 
of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance and the Special Rapporteur on racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. 
¶28 Over the relatively short time span of 10 years, the UNCHR, its successor the 
Human Rights Council (HRC), and even the UN General Assembly (U.N.G.A.) 
proceeded to pass regular resolutions dedicated to combating “Defamation of Religion.” 
A review of these resolutions demonstrates that invocation of the term “defamation” 
skyrocketed, from a solitary reference in 1999, to 23 references in 2009. Furthermore, 
placement of the term defamation within the resolution also shifted dramatically, from no 
references within the body of the resolution, up to eight preambulatory references 
coupled with eight additional operative references most recently in 2009.95 The repeated 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Commission on Human Rights, Draft Resolution 1999/ . . . Amendment to draft resolution 
E/CN.4/1999/L.40, ¶ 8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.90 (Apr. 22, 1999). The amendments were put forward by 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (joined by 
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Norway and Poland). 
89 Commission on Human Rights, Proposed sub-amendments to the amendments to draft resolution 
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 contained in document E/CN.4/1999/L.90, ¶ 1, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.104 (April 28, 
1999).  
90 Summary Record, supra note 84, ¶ 8. 
91 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1999/82, Defamation of Religions, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/82 
(Apr. 30, 1999). (Adopted without a vote). 
92 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 62nd Meeting, [1999] para. 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/SR.62 (Nov. 17, 1999). 
93 Id., at ¶ 9. 
94 UNHCR, Res. 1999/82, supra note 91, at ¶ 6. 
95 Operative paragraphs of UN resolutions are typically action-oriented statements intended to create or 
advance policy. In contrast, preambulary text is explanatory in purpose, and provides justifications for 
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use of defamation in the operative clauses of these resolutions necessarily gives its 
meaning new significance. To understand this significance, it is helpful to start with the 
legal definition of defamation and explore the implications of efforts to graft this concept 
onto protection of religion within the framework of international law. 
B. Defining Defamation of Religion: Challenges to Existing Principles of Defamation 
Law and International Human Rights Law 
1. Understanding Defamation Law 
¶29 Although specifics vary from state to state, defamation is classically defined 
as the “act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third 
person,”96 or as an intentional false communication that injures another person’s 
reputation.97 From this, several important elements are obvious: first, the offense must be 
directed at individuals (or in certain potential instances, at groups98) rather than at an 
idea, concept, or set of beliefs; and second, if the statement is merely an opinion, rather 
than an assertion of fact, a claim for defamation typically cannot be supported. In 
addition to the existing common law defense of fair comment,99 under Australia’s unified 
defamation law, a statutory defense to alleged defamation arises, inter alia, where the 
defendant proves that: 
(a) the matter was an expression of opinion of the defendant rather than a 
statement of fact, and 
(b) the opinion related to a matter of public interest, and 
(c) the opinion is based on proper material.100 
¶30 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the distinction between fact 
and opinion remains relevant in establishing whether a defamation claim is actionable. In 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,101 the Court held communication in the form of an 
opinion may be considered defamatory, but only if the statement of the opinion implies 
that the speaker has knowledge of provably false (i.e. defamatory) but undisclosed 
facts.102 In other words, the opinion may be defamatory only if it is premised on some 
                                                                                                                                                 
action undertaken in the resolution’s operative part. Data on file with the author. For a more detailed 
treatment of how defamation of religion arrived at the U.N., see Blitt, supra note 80. 
96 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
97 Special Rapporteur on Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression, The 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/55 
(Dec. 30, 2005). This applies to individuals and corporations alike. 
98 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952), a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to 
endorse the notion of group libel claims. However, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has observed 
that “cases decided since Beauharnais…have substantially undercut this support. To the extent that 
Beauharnais can be read as endorsing group libel claims, it has been so weakened by subsequent cases 
such as New York Times that the Seventh Circuit has stated that these cases ‘had so washed away the 
foundations of Beauharnais that it cannot be considered authoritative’…We agree with the Seventh Circuit 
that the permissibility of group libel claims is highly questionable at best.” Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine 
Inc. 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. App. 1989). 
99 David Rolph, A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws 16.3 TORTS L.J. 207, 237 (2008). 
100 Defamation Act, 2005, § 31.1 (N.S.W.). 
101 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
102 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977).  
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precursory and provably false statement of fact. However, the plaintiff must still show 
that the false implications of the communication were made with some level of fault to 
support recovery. As this practice indicates, a showing of intent may be required in 
certain instances.  
¶31 Although the decision in Milkovich represented a more nuanced elaboration 
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, it preserved the core 
principle that “there is no such thing as a false idea” under the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.103 Moreover, Milkovich reaffirmed that statements which could not 
“reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts” about an individual would fail to 
satisfy the test for defamation.104 In the majority’s view, this protection served as 
“assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the 
‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our 
Nation.”105 
2. Enforcing a Prohibition on Defamation of Religion: Definitional and Legal 
Impediments 
¶32 With this overview in mind, the problem of relying on defamation as a legal 
framework for protecting religion becomes evident. First, enforcement of and limitations 
on defamation vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, making it virtually impossible to 
extract clear, consistent rules regarding its application to individuals. Beyond this, 
applying defamation to various systems of belief that come with their own sets of unique 
but improvable truth claims further complicates the effort. These claims often may be 
directly at odds with the competing claims of another religious group. Indeed, the latter 
group may even consider such rival views “defamatory.” However, because these 
scenarios do not deal in provable statements of fact, defamation law cannot effectively 
address them. The problem of providing a workable definition of “defamation of 
religion” is so apparent that after ten years of passing resolutions, neither the HRC nor 
the U.N.G.A. has ventured to undertake the task.106 
¶33 The conceptual challenge of defamation of religion is exacerbated further 
when considering the nature and purpose of international human rights law. To begin, 
international human rights law, and specifically the right to freedom of religion or belief, 
“does not include the right to have a religion or belief that is free from criticism or 
ridicule.”107 This same body of law also recognizes individuals’ right to freedom of 
expression; and while that right may be limited in certain narrowly tailored contexts, hurt 
feelings alone do not rise to the level of a violation of rights that would justify such a 
limitation.108 Recognizing such a limitation under international human rights law would 
                                                 
103 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
104 Milkovich, supra note 101, at 2706. 
105 Id. at 2697. 
106 Instead, there is a new emphasis on blurring the boundary between defamation and the concept of 
incitement. See Part III(B)(3). 
107 Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief and on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (20 Sept. 2006) (by Asma 
Jahangir & Doudou Diène). [hereinafter Jahangir & Diène]. 
108 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19.3, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Restrictions must be provided by law, and be necessary: (a) For respect of the 
rights or reputations of others; [and] (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
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entail nothing less than a reordering of rights resulting in the censoring of free expression 
by limiting “scholarship on religious issues and…[by] asphyxiat[ing] honest debate or 
research.”109  
¶34 This reordering would also undermine freedom of religion, the very right 
supporters of outlawing defamation argue requires greater protection. The history 
associated with protecting religious freedom is intimately tied to the protection of 
minority rights.110 However, blasphemy charges typically are used to stifle the freedom of 
religion or belief of minority groups disfavored by the dominant faith. Granting the 
charge of defamation an international imprimatur allows it to be used not as a shield, but 
rather as a sword to silence those deemed to have religious or political beliefs at odds 
with the faith supported by the ruling party. Perhaps in response to this risk, the UN 
Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts tasked with interpreting the 
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
monitoring its implementation,111 concluded almost twenty years ago that: 
If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, 
proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not 
result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 [freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion] or any other rights recognized under the 
Covenant nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the 
official ideology or who oppose it.112 
Further, establishing defamation of religion as a legitimate basis for suppressing speech 
would essentially ascribe greater priority to the protection of a set of ideas rather than to 
individuals, an outcome antithetical to the very impetus for international human rights 
law.113 
¶35 Despite these red flags – and in contradiction to the recommendations of at 
least one UN special rapporteur at the time – the HRC and the U.N.G.A. in 2007 
proceeded with efforts to modify the longstanding consensus surrounding human rights 
norms. In similar resolutions, both UN bodies asserted  
… that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which should be 
exercised with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations as 
provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of 
                                                                                                                                                 
public), or of public health or morals.”). 
109 Jahangir & Diène, supra note 107, at ¶ 42.  
110 See, e.g., Little Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 (the 1919 treaty between Poland and the League of 
Nations addressing minority rights in the newly created Polish state). 
111 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights 
Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights,  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2010).  
112 OHCHR, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion. Art. 
18, ¶ 10 (July 30, 1993). 
113 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948) (“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom 
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people.”). 
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others, protection of national security or of public order, public health or 
morals and respect for religions and beliefs.114 
¶36 This language signals surreptitious efforts by the U.N.G.A. and the HRC—
the body “responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights 
around the globe”115—to amend the longstanding legal consensus enshrined under the 
ICCPR. Using the limitations agreed upon in ICCPR article 19 as a jumping-off point, 
both resolutions unilaterally add a limitation on the right of freedom of expression, 
namely “respect for religions and beliefs.” In other words, in the minds of the voting 
majorities within the U.N.G.A. and HRC, speech labeled defamatory (or blasphemous) of 
religion is no longer worthy of protection, regardless of contrary views expressed by the 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief or in the ICCPR text. 
¶37 The steady effort on the part of OIC member states to entrench defamation of 
religion as an international norm again bore fruit in 2008, when the U.N.G.A. passed a 
similar resolution, calling, inter alia, for increased restrictions on freedom of 
expression.116 During voting in the Third Committee on the draft resolution submitted by 
Pakistan (again acting on behalf of OIC member states),117 the European Union 
maintained its position that “[it] did not see the concept of defamation of religions as 
valid in a human rights discourse; international human rights law protected primarily 
individuals, rather than religions as such, and religions or beliefs in most States did not 
enjoy legal personality.”118 
3. Which Way Forward: Defamation of Religion as Customary International Law or as a 
Form of Incitement? 
¶38 Although some states continue to claim that “defamation of religion” is an 
unworkable chimera, consistent majorities in the HRC and U.N.G.A. beg to differ. And 
yet, despite this majority, U.N.G.A. resolutions are arguably only a representation of that 
body’s opinion and therefore not legally binding. In accordance with the UN Charter, the 
U.N.G.A is not intended to serve as a legislative body: 
                                                 
114 See G.A. Res. 61/164, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2007); see also Human Rights Council 
Res. 4/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/4/9/ (30 March 2007). (The vote in the General Assembly was 111 votes 
to 54, with 18 abstentions. In the Council, the recorded vote was 24 to 14 with nine abstentions). 
115 OHCHR: The Human Rights Council, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/ (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2010). 
116 G.A. Res. 62/154, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/154 (Mar. 6, 2008) (The resolution passed with a recorded 
vote of 108 to 51, with 25 abstentions). See also G.A. Res. 10678 (X), U.N. Doc.GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 
2007).  
117 Pakistan, “Combating Defamation of Religions” (draft resolution), UN Doc. A/C.3/62/L.35, Nov. 2, 
2007. Subsequently, Belarus and Venezuela joined in sponsoring the draft resolution. Report of the Third 
Committee, “Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative 
approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” UN Doc. 
A/62/439/Add.2. The Third Committee endorsed the draft by a vote of 95 in favor to 52 against, with 30 
abstentions. For the voting record, see Annex III, UN Department of Public Information, Third Committee 
Approves Three Country-Specific Texts On Human Rights: Despite Opposition Led By Developing 
Countries, UN Doc. GA/SHC/3909, Nov. 20, 2007.  
118 U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3909, supra note 117. 
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The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within 
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of 
any organs provided for in the present Charter, and … may make 
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or to both on any such questions or matters.119 
However, it is also generally recognized that over time, U.N.G.A. resolutions may come 
to reflect and have the binding force of customary international law. The classic example 
of such practice is embodied in U.N.G.A. Resolution 217A (1948), more commonly 
known as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).120  Over time, this 
landmark Declaration has come to be acknowledged by a variety of authorities as 
reflective of customary international law norms.121  
¶39 Most recently at the end of 2009, the U.N.G.A. again endorsed a resolution 
on combating defamation of religion.122  The resolution received a record sixty-one “no” 
votes123 at the Assembly’s 64th session.124 Although the endorsement of a limitation on 
freedom of expression based on “respect for religions and beliefs” was conspicuously 
missing from the text,125 the resolution continued to express “deep concern” over “the 
intensification of the overall campaign of the defamation of religions” despite offering 
nothing to substantiate the finding.126 
¶40 At this point, a growing rift between the Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
expression, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and possibly the 
                                                 
119 U.N. Charter art. 10. 
120 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 113.  
121 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d. Cir. App. 1980) (the prohibition against torture 
“has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights…”); see also Hurst Hannum, The UDHR In National and International Law, vol. 3 no. 2 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145, 145 (Many of the Universal Declaration’s provisions also have become 
incorporated into customary international law, which is binding on all states”). This evolution occurred 
despite the fact that the UDHR’s drafters plainly intended it to have no legally binding effect on states. In 
the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, chairperson of the UN Commission on Human Rights tasked with drafting 
the document, the UDHR “was not a treaty or international agreement and did not impose legal obligations; 
it was rather a statement of basic principles of inalienable human rights setting up a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations.” 1948 U.N.Y.B. 527, U.N. Sales No. 1950.I.II. 
122 G.A. Res. 64/156, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156 (Mar. 8, 2010). The “Combating defamation of religions” 
resolution as passed in the Third Committee is referenced as UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II). 
123 UN Department of Public Information, “General Assembly Adopts 56 Resolutions, 9 Decisions 
Recommended by Third Committee on Broad Range of Human Rights, Social, Cultural Issues,” UN Doc. 
GA/10905 (Dec. 18, 2009), .  
124 The resolution (UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2, part II) was adopted by a recorded vote of 80 in favor to 61 
against, with 42 abstentions. Voting in favor were OIC states, the Russian Federation, and China, together 
with numerous African, Latin American, and Asian states. Australia, the United States, EU member states, 
and others voted against the text. See Annex VIII, UN Doc. GA/10905, supra note 123. One could make 
the case that the vote actually reflected a plurality rather than a majority since over 100 states either voted 
against or abstained. 
125 The provision is stricken from the paragraph addressing freedom of expression. It was also absent in 
2008. See Para. 10, UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), supra note 122, and ¶ 10, UN General Assembly 
Resolution, “Defamation of Religions,” UN Doc. A/RES/63/171, 24 March 2009 (emphasis added). Human 
Rights Council, “Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of 
traditional values of humankind,” UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/21, 12 October 2009. At the same time, the 
HRC passed an equally ominous new resolution entitled “Promoting human rights and fundamental 
freedom through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind.” Though some of the problems 
raised by this resolution are related, they fall outside the immediate scope of this article. 
126 UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), supra note 122. 
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Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights on the one hand, and certain U.N. 
member states on the other, has become evident.127 Most of the early reports prepared by 
Doudou Diène, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, signal strident support for prohibiting 
defamation of religion. For example, Diène urged “the Commission to invite the Special 
Rapporteur to submit a regular report on all manifestations of defamation of religion, 
stressing the strength and seriousness of Islamophobia at the present time.”128 In contrast, 
Diène’s predecessor Abdelfattah Amor stressed early on that “very frequently, 
prohibitions against acts of defamation or blasphemy are misused for the purposes of 
outright censorship of the right to criticism and discussion of religion and related 
questions,” and that in “many cases, defamation becomes the tool of extremists in 
censoring and maintaining or propagating obscurantism.”129 
¶41 Despite these sharp disagreements, a survey of the reporting by the U.N. 
special rapporteurs and the OHCHR over ten years indicates a recent about-face away 
from the defamation concept and in favor of addressing issues of concern through the 
offense of incitement. This sea change in attitude is particularly evident in 2008, even in 
Diène’s reporting. Although non-existent as a concern over nearly ten years, Diène 
suddenly argues that “[w]ith a view to promoting this change of paradigm, translating 
religious defamation from a sociological notion into a legal human rights concept, 
namely incitement to racial and religious hatred,” will show “that combating incitement 
to hatred is not a North-South ideological question but a reality present in a large 
majority of national legislations in all regions.”130  
¶42 This concerted effort to redirect the defamation debate away from its 
sociological overtones in favor of a protection regime grounded in the more palatable – 
and arguably legally definable – notion of incitement finds dramatic expression in a joint 
statement released by three special rapporteurs during the 2009 Durban Review 
Conference. Oddly, however, this important document lacks an official U.N. Document 
number and is virtually buried on the UN’s website.131 According to the special 
                                                 
127 The U.S. described the voting over the most recent defamation resolution as evidencing an “increasingly 
splintered view” within the General Assembly. UN Department of Public Information, “Third Committee 
Approves Resolution Aimed at ‘Combating Defamation of Religions’, One of 16 Draft Texts 
Recommended to General Assembly,” UN Doc. GA/SHC/3966 (Nov. 12, 2009).  
128Report by Mr. Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, ¶ 37, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/17 (Feb. 13, 2006). 
129Interim report by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, ¶ 97, UN Doc. A/55/280 (Sept. 8, 
2000). Still Amor also maintained that the issue of defamation reflected one of his “major 
concerns…because it is an intrinsic violation of the freedom of religion or belief.” Report submitted by Mr. 
Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, ¶ 137, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/63 
(Jan. 16, 2004). 
130 Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and 
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Program of Action, ¶ 45, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/12 (Sept. 2, 
2008). 
131 Joint statement by Mr. Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance; Ms. Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Religion or Belief; and Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious 
Hatred, OHCHR side event during the Durban Review Conference, Geneva, 1 (April 22, 2009), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/rapporteur/docs/Joint_Statement_SRs.pdf. Searching for 
“Joint statement of three special rapporteurs on incitement to racial or religious hatred” returns only two 
results from  http://search.ohchr.org and http://www.google.com alike. Searching for “Freedom of 
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rapporteurs who endorsed this statement, the concept of defamation of religion suffers 
from significant underlying problems: 
[T]he difficulties in providing an objective definition of the term 
“defamation of religions” at the international level make the whole 
concept open to abuse. At the national level, domestic blasphemy laws can 
prove counter-productive, since this could result in the de facto censure of 
all inter-religious and intra-religious criticism. Many of these laws afford 
different levels of protection to different religions and have often proved 
to be applied in a discriminatory manner. There are numerous examples of 
persecution of religious minorities or dissenters, but also of atheists and 
non-theists, as a result of legislation on religious offences or overzealous 
application of laws that are fairly neutral.132 
¶43 Even as certain individual and institutional voices have begun endorsing this 
position, it remains likely that the debate will continue to spill over to future U.N.G.A. 
sessions. The reality remains that a majority of states at the UN continue to favor 
promulgating a new norm prohibiting defamation of religion, even if means fitting it in 
under a more consensual rubric of incitement. As Masood Khan, Pakistan’s UN 
ambassador, reminded the HRC in 2008, the ultimate objective of OIC member states is 
nothing less than a “new instrument or convention” addressing defamation.133 The OIC 
already considers defamation a legitimate and existing norm: “The succession of 
U.N.G.A. and UNHRC [UN Human Rights Council] resolutions on the defamation of 
religions makes it a standalone concept with international legitimacy.”134 
¶44 In light of these views, the paradigm shift advocated by the special 
rapporteurs remains uncertain at best. Even if the U.N.G.A. and the HRC drop the effort 
to entrench a norm built around the specific language of defamation, there is little 
indication that a compromise based on “incitement to religious hatred” would function 
any differently in practice. In other words, OIC member states and other governments 
may still invoke the incitement model to establish a justification under international law 
for outlawing speech, religious practice, and other actions deemed blasphemous. It is 
worthwhile to recall here that support for a defamation of religion norm transcends OIC 
member states. Countries such as Russia and China continue to be strong proponents of 
the norm. For example, the former Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch, Alexy II, latched 
onto the concept of defamation of religion as a basis for building Christian-Muslim 
cooperation: “In the framework of international organizations, it seems useful to create 
mechanisms that make it possible to be more sensitive to the spiritual and cultural 
traditions of various peoples.”135  
                                                                                                                                                 
Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred” returns eight hits, four of which are UN-based 
websites. The document can also be accessed from 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/index.htm. 
132 Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred, supra note 131, at ¶ 2. 
133 Steven Edwards, UN anti-blasphemy measures have sinister goals, observers say, CANWEST NEWS 
SERVICE, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www2.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=9b8e3a6d-795d-440f-
a5de-6ff6e78c78d5.  
134 2nd OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, June 2008 to April 2009, issued at the 36th council of 
foreign ministers, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, May 23-25, 2009, 4 (emphasis added).  
135 “Response from His Holiness Patriarchy Alexy II of Moscow and all Russia [to the open letter of 138 
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IV. DEFAMATION OF RELIGION AND DRAFTING AUSTRALIA’S BILL OF RIGHTS 
¶45 In the immediate context of ongoing efforts to better protect and promote 
human rights in Australia, through the development of a bill of rights,136 the issue of 
defamation of religion merits consideration for a number of reasons. First, accounting for 
current international human rights debates in any final instrument may better position that 
document to meet potential future challenges. For example, by exploring the issue of 
defamation, drafters of a bill of rights can address the scope and priority to be assigned to 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief, including what limitations may 
be applicable and when. Such a step can be a useful part of the process of determining 
where Australia wants to situate itself and its citizens vis à vis emerging human rights 
norms. This approach is also in sync with the Australian Human Rights Consultation 
Committee’s finding that “newly emerging rights in international law – such as the right 
to a clean and sustainable environment – are constantly in the Australian public’s 
gaze.”137 In other words, Australians favor an open-minded and exploratory approach that 
enables consideration of unsettled questions related to rights. Such an approach should 
necessarily consider lex lata, but also lex ferenda and other sources of potential norms 
that offer a more expansive interpretation of emerging human rights principles. 
¶46 Second, a robust upfront discussion on defamation of religion can help 
resolve potential inconsistencies between Australian foreign policy and national law. This 
is particularly important given Australia’s ambivalent position regarding the protection of 
religion under defamation-based offenses. Although Australia’s international voting 
record at the UN reveals a national distaste for defamation of religion resolutions, 
domestic legislative initiatives indicate the possibility of allowing prosecution of such 
offenses in the name of fostering tolerance. For example, Victoria’s controversial Racial 
and Religious Tolerance Act (“the Act”) specifically prohibits “conduct that incites 
hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule” of persons “on the 
ground of religious belief or activity.”138 The Act also provides various exceptions, 
including where conduct of the accused is deemed to have occurred reasonably and in 
good faith: 
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made 
or held, or any other conduct engaged in, for –  
(i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious139 or scientific purpose; or 
(ii) any purpose that is in the public interest; or 
(c) in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any event or 
matter of public interest.140 
                                                                                                                                                 
Muslim Theologians],” April 18, 2008, http://acommonword.com/en/a-common-word/6-christian-
responses/202-response-from-his-holiness-patriarchy-alexy-ii-of-moscow-and-all-russia.html. 
136 This is in fact one of the objectives of Australia’s National Human Rights Consultation process. See 
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Terms_of_Reference.  
137 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 346.  
138 Art. 8, Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, No. 47 of 2001 (Version No. 006), incorporating 
amendments as at 1 October 2009. 
139 An amendment added in 2006 provides that “a religious purpose includes, but is not limited to, 
conveying or teaching a religion or proselytizing.” Id. Art. 11(2). 
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¶47 Disturbingly, the Act renders motive irrelevant in determining whether an 
offense has occurred141 and boasts an extra-territorial effect covering conduct that may 
have transpired outside of Victoria proper.142 Nevertheless, it would appear that the law 
does not afford protection to religious beliefs per se, but rather only to adherents as 
individuals or as a class of persons. In Fletcher v. Salvation Army Australia, the 
administrative tribunal found that the Act: 
is not concerned with the vilification of a religious belief or activity as 
such. Rather it is concerned with the vilification of a person, or a class of 
persons, on the ground of the religious belief or activity of the person or 
class … The law does not stop a person from engaging in conduct that 
involves contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a religious belief or activity, 
provided this does not incite hatred against, serious contempt for, or 
revulsion or severe ridicule of another person or a class of persons on the 
ground of such belief or activity. The law recognises that you can hate the 
idea without hating the person.143 
¶48 Beyond this, other constituencies in Australia have expressed support for a 
prohibition on defamation of religion. During a government-sponsored inquiry into 
revising the existing law on blasphemy in NSW,144 the New South Wales Council of 
Churches (NSWCC) offered detailed submissions in favor of a new codification of the 
offense of blasphemy. As part of this re-codification effort, the NSWCC expressed 
support for retaining the offense but replacing the term “blasphemy” with either 
“religious vilification” or “religious defamation,” labels the NSWCC argued would avoid 
any misunderstanding or misconstruing of the offense while preserving its essence 
(namely, the prohibition of criticism of religious beliefs and symbols).145 Drafters of any 
bill of rights should be cognizant of such domestic expressions of support for retaining a 
blasphemy offense for two reasons: first, they mirror efforts on the international level to 
package an old offense in new, less “offensive” terms; and second, because such 
supporters still deserve a thoughtful explanation as to why reviving blasphemy may be at 
odds with other rights and values contemplated as worthy of protection under any future 
rights instrument.  
¶49 Therefore, the importance of having drafters clarify Australia’s position 
cannot be overstated. This becomes particularly evident when considering the emerging 
law in Ireland. Like Australia, Ireland has consistently voted against defamation of 
religion resolutions at the UN. Following the December 2008 vote on “Combating 
Defamation of Religion,” Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheál Martin, 
explained:  
                                                                                                                                                 
140 Id. at Art. 11(1). Article 12 addresses exceptions for private conduct, “in circumstances that may 
reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties to the conduct desire it to be heard or seen only by 
themselves.” 
141 Id. Art. 9(1). 
142 Id. Art. 8(2)(b). 
143 Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia (Anti Discrimination) [2005] VCAT 1523, ¶ 7 (1 August 2005). 
144 For a discussion of the Commission’s findings, see Part II(a) above. 
145 NSW Blasphemy Report, supra note 33, ¶ 4.40. 
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We believe that the concept of defamation of religion is not consistent 
with the promotion and protection of human rights. It can be used to 
justify arbitrary limitations on, or the denial of, freedom of expression. 
Indeed, Ireland considers that freedom of expression is a key and inherent 
element in the manifestation of freedom of thought and conscience and as 
such is complementary to freedom of religion or belief.146  
¶50 However, Ireland’s constitution has long provided that the “publication or 
utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be 
punishable in accordance with law.”147 To this end, a 2009 law enacted by the 
Oireachtas148 has made it a fineable offense for anyone to publish or utter “blasphemous 
matter.”149 Under the new law, in force since January 2010, a blasphemous 
communication “is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any 
religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that 
religion.”150 
¶51 Unlike Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, the Irish law 
establishes a mens rea threshold: prosecutors must demonstrate the accused intended “by 
the publication or utterance of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.”151 The law 
also affords a defense to the charges if the defendant can prove “that a reasonable person 
would find genuine literary, artistic, political, scientific, or academic value in the matter 
to which the offence relates.”152 However, these grounds are arguably narrower than 
Victoria’s since no reference is made to the legitimacy of religious or public interest 
purposes. More problematic still, Ireland’s law explicitly protects “matters held sacred by 
any religion.” It therefore appears to track more closely with the push to outlaw 
defamation of religion at the UN, giving rise to an apparent inconsistency – if not outright 
conflict – between the law itself and statements of Foreign Affairs Minister Martin. As it 
stands, Ireland’s Defamation Act potentially may run afoul of that country’s obligations 
under international law and the European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, at least 
one group has already taken steps to challenge the legality of the Irish law’s provisions 
                                                 
146 New Blasphemy Laws—Free Speech is Not Up For Discussion, IRISH EXAMINER, May 1, 2009, 
http://www.examiner.ie/opinion/editorial/new-blasphemy-laws--free-speech-is-not-up-for-discussion-
90664.  
147 Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 40. 
148 A strict time limit, known as a guillotine, was imposed on the debate in the Dáil. Following the lower 
house vote, Ireland’s Seanad passed the bill in a nail-biting 23-22 vote, with the Green Party voting in 
favor. Libel law revisions pass the Dáil, July 8, 2009, http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0708/libel.html. 
Stephen Collins, Defamation Bill stumbles through Seanad after lost vote, IRISH TIMES, Jul. 10, 2009, 
 http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0710/1224250388598.html.  
149 Art. 36(1), Defamation Bill 2006. A fine may run up to €25,000. Prior drafts of the law originally called 
for a maximum €100,000 fine for the offense.  
150 Id. Art. 36(2)(a). 
151 Id. Art. 36(2)(b). 
152 Id. Art. 36(3). 
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on “blasphemous matter,”153 and there is some speculation that the government will hold 
a public referendum to address the issue.154 
¶52 By encouraging the drafters of Australia’s bill of rights to confront questions 
related to religious defamation and vilification directly, potential inconsistencies in law 
and foreign policy similar to those arising in Ireland may be avoided. There is already 
some guidance on this issue emerging from the Australian judiciary, including expression 
of a narrow definition of incitement,155 as well as a directive to avoid conflating hatred of 
a given belief and hatred of adherents of that belief in the legal context. In Catch the Fire 
Ministries v. Islamic Council of Victoria, the Victoria Court of Appeal found that the 
lower tribunal failed to consider that distinction, and held that the Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act does not “purport to mandate religious tolerance.”156 According to the 
Court, the Act “goes no further in restricting freedom to criticise the religious beliefs of 
others than to prohibit criticism so extreme as to incite hatred or other relevant emotion 
of or towards those others. It is essential to keep the distinction between the hatred of 
beliefs and the hatred of their adherents steadily in view.”157 
¶53 Finally, even if the drafters of an Australian bill of rights reject the 
defamation norm currently espoused by a majority of UN member states, the process of 
reaching this decision will help establish the legal justifications for such a position. 
Within the context of a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed norm, this would 
position the bill of rights to address, either head-on or implicitly, any possible future gaps 
or inconsistencies between international human rights law and Australia’s domestic 
implementation of rights. Similarly, in the event defamation of religion is confirmed as a 
customary international law norm, Australia will be able to point to its internal bill of 
rights debate as evidence of its status as a persistent objector opposed to such a norm. In 
short, drafters can enshrine a more long-term vision of which rights are germane to 
Australia and how these rights will operate by evaluating not only norms expressed in the 
relevant treaty law, but also the emerging and potential norms on or just beyond the 
horizon. This process would also have the benefit of strengthening Australia’s prestige on 
the international level by “limit[ing] future criticism for non-compliance [and] 
bolster[ing] Australia’s credibility when [it comments] on human rights abuses in other 
jurisdictions.”158 
                                                 
153 For example, an Irish atheist group published a series of “blasphemous” quotations by personalities 
including Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Mark Twain, Salman Rushdie and Bjork in an effort to challenge the 
law in court. CNN, Irish Atheists Use Bjork, Mark Twain to Challenge Blasphemy Law, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/01/02/ireland.blasphemy.law/index.html.  
154 Compare Michael O’Regan, Now Not the Time For Referendum on Blasphemy, Says Ahern, THE IRISH 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0326/1224267097750.html, with 
Henry McDonald, Ireland to Hold Referendum on Blasphemy Law, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Mar. 15, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/15/ireland-referendum-blasphemy-law. 
155 For example, in Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia, the tribunal focused on the meaning of “incite” 
under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act: “In its context, this does not mean ‘causes.’ Rather it carries 
the connotation of ‘inflame’ or ‘set alight’. The section is not concerned with conduct that provokes 
thought.” Fletcher v. Salvation Army, supra note 143, at ¶ 5. 
156 Catch the Fire Ministries v. Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284, ¶ 34. 
157 Id. 
158 Australia’s National Human Rights Consultation Report has observed that passage of a Human Rights 
Act would result in improved international standing for Australia. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at xxv. 




¶54 This article has argued that there is much value and benefit to opening the 
drafting process surrounding a bill of rights to outside ideas and comparative data. 
Beyond increasing awareness and challenging preconceptions, such an approach provides 
a more robust and grounded domestic debate, and can facilitate an outcome that provides 
reasons and justifications for decisions. Taken together, these measures ultimately can 
help establish the foundation for fewer surprises down the road. 
¶55 As the last Western democracy without some form of a bill of rights, 
Australia finds itself in an awkward, but potentially enviable, position. On the one hand, 
its citizens lack a clear understanding and expression of their rights and freedoms,159 and 
the country itself risks being isolated from developments in similar legal systems and 
may suffer diminished stature during human rights discussions within international 
fora.160 On the other hand, standing at the threshold of a decision to draft a genuinely 
Australian human rights instrument holds significant promise: to empower citizens 
through a participatory drafting model, meaningfully engage with a body of international 
law that has advanced dramatically in the short span of sixty years, and create a document 
that not only adopts existing minimum standards, but also contemplates and accounts for 
emerging human rights norms. Based on Australia’s long history of support for 
international human rights and the findings of the National Human Rights Commission, it 
is evident that Australians will not settle for an instrument that merely reflects the floor 
without consideration of the ceiling as well. 
¶56 In the context of defamation of religion, it is clear that a majority of UN 
member states support greater protection of religious symbols and beliefs, even if it 
comes at the expense of freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion or belief. This emerging norm – regardless of whether it is labeled “defamation 
of religion” or “incitement to religious hatred” – is part of an ongoing debate over the 
substance of international human rights. Therefore, it should figure in any future 
deliberations over the content and scope of rights in Australia. By recognizing this issue 
and accounting for it during the drafting process, Australians can measure their vision of 
domestic rights against the one emerging on the international level and, if disparities 
arise, provide the necessary justifications in advance rather than post facto.  
¶57 To be certain, the concept of defamation of religion is fraught with 
difficulties. However, navigating through these difficulties will ensure an open and 
participatory process, shine greater light on Australia’s national values and identity, and 
result in a more durable final instrument capable of addressing future challenges. 
Undertaking this exercise has the added benefits of helping to flesh out and test more 
general positions relating to issues including balancing of rights and limitations, and of 
clarifying potential inconsistencies in Australia’s domestic law and foreign policy. 
Importantly, these advantages should be reproducible regarding assessments of other 
similarly emerging norms drafters may choose to investigate in the future. 
 
                                                 
159 The National Human Rights Consultation Committee “found a lack of understanding among Australians 
of what human rights are.” Id., at xvii. 
160 Id., at xxv. 
